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B. GLEN CRAWFORD, PAULA 
CRAWFORD, AND CRAWFORD ] 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, A Utah 
Limited Partnership, 
Defendants-Appellants 
CASE NO. 880567-CA 
Argument Priority 
i Classification 14.b 
JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from an Order of Dismissal With Prejudice 
entered on July 13, 1988, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in 
and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip 
Eves presiding. (See Record, Vol. 2 [hereafter II], at 91-92.) 
Jurisdiction for appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was conferred 
pursuant to Rule 3(a), Rules of Utah Supreme Court. Appellants 
perfected their appeal with the District Court on August 10, 1988 
(II at 126-133). Thereafter, the Utah Supreme Court transmitted 
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to its vested 
authority, over the signature of Geoffrey J. Butler (II at 138). 
This case was initiated by Respondents in December, 1985, 
seeking $100,000.00 in liquidated damages, lost profits, costs, and 
attorney's fees alleging Appellant's breach of covenant not to 
compete (see Record, Vol. 1 [hereafter I], at 3.) Appellants 
answered, denying their breach, and requested attorney's fees in 
defending the suit pursuant to Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, or, alternatively, "as provided in the parties' 
contract." (I at 24). Trial was set for June 22 and 23 of 1988. 
(II at 26) . Approximately one month prior to trial, Respondents 
filed a motion, requesting the District Court to dismiss their 
complaint because Respondents were then financially unable to 
further prosecute the suit (II at 35) . This motion was initially 
heard on June 7, 1988. At that time, Respondents indicated that 
they might be agreeable to a dismissal with prejudice (Recorder's 
Transcript, June 7, 1988 [hereinafter Tl] , at 4.) Respondents 
resisted Appellant's contention that in the event of dismissal, 
Appellants were entitled, as prevailing parties, to present evidence 
of their attorney's fees. Barring that, Appellants resisted 
dismissal of the claim (Id. at 6; See also II at 40.) Appellant's 
counsel requested that he be permitted to go forward with evidence 
as to Appellant's attorney's fees, subject to cross-examination. 
However, the lower court denied Appellants this opportunity (See 
Reporter's Transcript, June 20, 1988. [hereinafter T2] at 8-9.) The 
lower court rationale was as follows: 
Having reviewed the Memorandum filed by the counsel, the 
Motion to Dismiss is granted. The trial date which was 
this Wednesday is vacated. 
The Motion for attorney's fees is denied. The reason 
being that it is apparent from the pleadings in the file 
that the reasons that Plaintiffs have sought to dismiss 
the case is not because they feel that they have not 
prevailed or could not prevail, but because they were 
under extreme financial pressures which prevented them 
from going forward. 
Under those circumstances, I find that neither party has 
prevailed, and neither party is entitled to attorney's 
fees under the contract (^Id at 9) . 
From the above ruling Appellants have brought this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the Trial Court have sole discretion regarding the 
award of attorney's fees? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that 
neither party prevailed within the meaning of the contract and that 
no attorney's fees should be awarded either party. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Citations to constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
and rules wherever appropriate, will occur in the text of this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties negotiated through late 1984 and early 1985 to 
reach an agreement for Plaintiffs to buy the business of Defendants, 
known as Crawford Toyota. (See generally Deposition of Lewis 
Canfield, November 18, 1986, [hereafter Lewis Canfield I], pp. 
47-50). Crawford had operated Crawford Toyota for a decade, making 
it a successful dealership for Toyotas and used cars. He always 
participated personally in sales and managed the business alone as 
it grew. (See Deposition of Glen Crawford, January 5, 1988, 
[hereafter Glen Crawford II, pp. 29-30.) 
The Toyota line included small trucks, small cars, sports cars, 
and larger sedans. Competition with this line of new cars came from 
many other car dealerships in St. George, i.e., Sunland or Anthony 
Chevrolet, Bradshaw Ford, Peterson or Newby Buick Pontiac 
Oldsmobile. Later Nissan or Datsun and Mazda dealerships also 
competed with the Toyota vehicle line. According to Crawford, a 
buyer's interest and therefore market competition was focused 
primarily or principally on price. Often buyers would shop other 
dealers outside the immediate area in search of the best price. 
Make or model was not as important to a buyer who was shopping for a 
certain class of automobile. The critical factor was price. 
Crawford was in competition with dealers for all different makes of 
the same class of automobile. (Glen Crawford II, pp. 15-16). 
The Plaintiffs had searched throughout the West for a 
dealership that they could purchase. Plaintiffs located the 
Crawford business, and made preliminary investigations of the market 
and Crawford's reputation. All indications were deservedly positive. 
(See Deposition of LeRoy Cobabe, January 26, 1987, [hereafter LeRoy 
Cobabe] pp. 17-22.) 
When Crawford and Plaintiffs came to discuss terms, Crawford 
insisted on receiving $200,000.00 more than the value of the hard 
assets of the business. (Glen Crawford II, pp. 48-49.) The real 
estate was worth $425,000.00, and equipment and inventory were worth 
approximately $80,000.00. Since the cars on the lot were financed 
(floored) they were not included in the price calculations. 
Crawford called the $200,000.00 premium "Blue Sky"; it was the value 
he placed on the ongoing business. He also called it "good will". 
(Glen Crawford II, p. 49.) (See also Deposition of Lewis Canfield 
January 6, 1987, [hereafter Lewis Canfield II], p. 9). Crawford had 
some old auto sale agreements from which he was preparing a draft 
for this transaction. He proposed in the first draft of the 
agreement he typed that the $200,000.00 of "Blue Sky" be allocated 
to "obsolete equipment" i.e. other than those shown on Schedule B" 
(Deposition of Glen Crawford, November 17, 1986, [hereafter Glen 
Crawford I] p. 119, Exhibit 4). 
Plaintiffs, however, were not willing to pay $200,000.00 for 
imaginary equipment. Since they insisted Crawford not compete with 
the business to preserve the value of the goodwill and going concern 
of the purchase, they suggested that they allocate $100,000.00 to 
Crawford's covenant not to compete. Crawford agreed. Since the 
business they were buying was built by Crawford, keeping him out of 
competition was essential to maintaining the value of the "going 
concern" and "goodwill" they were buying. (Lewis Canfield II, p. 
10) . The parties discussed the plans Crawford had for becoming a 
wholesaler of used cars. This meant he would have a used car lot in 
St. George as well. They discussed that Plaintiff might add another 
line of cars. They agreed that Crawford would not sell new cars and 
would not be in competition with the Toyota business he was selling. 
Crawford insisted on a right to do what he wanted in Cedar City, on 
his father's lot, known as Crawford Motors. (Lewis Canfield 
Deposition, pp. 15, 30.) 
Once Crawford agreed that he would not sell new cars, 
(Deposition of Lewis Canfield 1, p. 60-61) (See also Deposition of 
LeRoy Cobabe, pp. 27-29) the Plaintiffs were ready to place 
$20,000.00 earnest money in escrow. Crawford agreed to retype the 
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agreement. (Record II, pp. 22-23) 
A revised agreement was first shown to Plaintiffs at the office 
of Southern Utah Title Company in St. George. Plaintiff Canfield 
asked Crawford about the language. The document read: 
2. The seller covenants for a fee of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($100f000.00) not to compete with a new car 
franchise within a 30 mile radius of current dealership 
for a period of two years from the date of closing. 
(Record II, p. 23) 
The paragraph exempted Cedar City from its coverage by the 30 
mile radius. It included the reference to the $100,000.00. At the 
time a period of two years was also included. Canfield asked 
Crawford if it meant that he wouldn't sell new cars. Crawford said 
that is what it said and that is what it meant. (Id.) Crawford would 
not compete with a new car franchise. He would not compete with a 
new car franchise that was sold, or a new car franchise that the 
Plaintiff acquired, or with any of the others in town, because that 
would put Crawford in the new car market. He was selling his piece 
of that market to Plaintiffs for $100,000.00. (Lewis Canfield II, p. 
10.) 
Crawford, however, violated that agreement several times. He 
obtained new Toyota automobiles from Toyota dealerships out of the 
area and sold them to customers from his used car lot. (Record II, 
p. 23 and Glen Crawford I, pp. 146-166.) He personally sold to at 
least one of those customers who had shopped the St. George Toyota 
lot owned by Plaintiffs. Crawford made the sale because his price 
was lower. (Glen Crawford II, pp. 40, 54.) 
After a few incidents of sales of new Toyotas from his lot, the 
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technical wording of the code, defendants have formulated three 
propositions: (1) Cars sold by the defendants were not new because 
they were licensed as used cars by the buyers of the vehicle, (2) 
Cars sold by defendants could not be new because they sold them as a 
used car dealer, and (3) Defendants did not violate the law, and 
therefore did not violate its agreement with Plaintiffs. Defendants 
conclude that since they were licensed to sell used cars they could 
sell new cars. 
All these arguments hinge on Defendants reading of the 
agreement as only prohibiting them from having a new car franchise. 
But the agreement itself says (and was affirmed by Crawford) that 
Defendants will not conduct business that will compete with the new 
car franchise. Clearly selling low mileage, new Toyotas is 
competitive with any new car franchise and is clearly competitive 
with Plaintiff's business. Whether a state calls a car new on its 
records is irrelevant to whether it is competitive with Plaintiffs 
and the franchise sold to them. Nothing in the agreement references 
state law or permits what ever state law will allow. Plaintiffs 
have testified in their depositions that their agreement with 
Defendants did not consider or countenance the provisions of the 
Utah State Motor Vehicle Code. They just relied on what the 
agreement was intended to accomplish. (Lewis Canfield I, p. 71.) 
The agreement prohibited or was intended to prohibit competitive 
activity. Crawford himself admits that a few hundred miles on a car 
does nothing to reduce its value as compared with a no-miles car. 
(Glen Crawford II, pp. 36-37.) He states that buyers bought from 
him because he gave them the btw.
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breached a covenant not to compete, Defendants had agreed that 
dismissal would be appropriate, one of the Plaintiffs had filed 
bankruptcy, the remaining Plaintiff was financially unable to 
continue in the lawsuit, and because Defendant's request was 
untimely. 
3. The contract provision requiring defendant "not to compete 
with a new car franchise within a 30 mile radius of current 
dealership for a period of two (2) years from the date of closing" 
was drafted by Defendant. Defendant used the ambiguity of this 
provision to compete with Plaintiff by selling new cars in 
derrogation to previous verbal and written agreements between the 
parties. The Defendant's conduct was clearly unconscionable and 
resulted in his receiving a windfall of $100,000.00 since his 
conduct deteriorated the "goodwill" he had sold to the Plaintiffs. 
Defendants should not merit an award of attorney's fees under these 
set of facts. 
4. Appellant should be estopped from claiming attorney's fees 
since their conduct and disregard of the parties' agreement renders 
the noncompetitive provision null and void. 
5. If Appellant prevails in their appeal, attorney's fees 
should not be awarded since Appellants were not defending a result 
in their favor from the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
U.C.A. §78-27-56.5 EMPOWERS THE TRIAL COURT WITH 
DISCRETION TO AWARD OR NOT AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
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by the distinguishing language. 
The 1981 version of U.C.A. Section 78-27-56 is entitled: 
Attorney1s Fees-Award Where Action or Defense in Bad Faith. That 
section provided that the court "may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action 
or defense to the action was without merit". The amendment of this 
statute in 1988 changed the statute from a discretionary one to a 
nondiscretionary statute by inserting the word shall for the word 
may. Interestingly, the statute now provides for an exception to 
the mandate of awarding reasonable attorney's fees which is provided 
under subsection (2). The statute reads as follows: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, 
except under subsection (2). 
(2) The Court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party under subsection (1) , but 
only if the court: (a) finds the party has filed an 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity in the action before the court; 
or (b) the Court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of subsection (1). 
Here we have an interesting approach by the Legislature which 
has made an award of attorney's fees mandatory and yet has provided 
for an equitable exception to that rule (giving the Court 
discretion) in the event the party against whom the attorney's fees 
would ordinarily be awarded is in a state of impecuniosity. 
Moreover, the court may upon appropriate basis not award attorney's 
fees ai
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incurred to enforce the provisions of the contract shall 
be awarded to one of the parties, the prevailing party, 
whether that party is the party specified in the contract 
or not, at trial or on appeal, shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees in addition to costs and 
necessary disbursements. 
With regard to contract actions the Revised Code of Washington 
Annotated 4.84.330 provides: 
In any action on a contract or lease entered into after 
September 21, 1977, where such contract or lease 
specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, 
which are incurred to enforce the provisions of such 
contract or lease, shall be awarded to one of the parties, 
the prevailing party, whether he is the party specified in 
the contract or lease or not, shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees in addition to costs and 
necessary disbursements. 
This court should not base its decision on the laws of 
Washington and Oregon and Appellant's reliance on the laws of those 
states is misplaced. 
Appellants cite case after case, both in Utah and in other 
jurisdictions where trial courts have been upheld in their 
determination of the prevailing party and award of attorney's fees. 
It is interesting in light of that weight of authority that 
Appellant attempts in its brief to characterize the Utah law as 
mandating that the trial court award attorney's fees without 
acknowledging the discretion that lies in the trial court to 
determine these matters. The clear position of the Utah courts is 
that an award of attorney's fees is in the sole discretion of the 
trial court and will not be overturned in absence of showing clear 
abuse of that discretion. Sears v Riemersma, 655 P.2d, 1105, 1110 
(Utah 1982). Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1978). 
20 AM _ur 2d 59, §73, 
ARGUMENT 
ri 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT Abf?i: ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANT AND SHOULD BE UPHELD 
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
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unique set of facts and circumstances with a very unique result. 
Probably the only one of its kind. Nonetheless the discretion of 
the trial court was upheld because of the basic rule of law that an 
award of attorney fs fees is within the discretion of the trial 
court. Our case likewise is very unique in that the lower court 
decided or determined as a matter of law that there was no 
successful or prevailing party in the lawsuit consistent with the 
provisions of the contract and that an award of attorney fs fees 
under the circumstances would not be appropriate. Just as in the 
cases previously cited, the trial court's discretion which is based 
upon proper evidence should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
III 
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT OF SELLING NEW CARS WAS IN DERROGATION 
TO PREVIOUS VERBAL AND WRITTEN AGREEMENTS AND WAS CLEARLY . 
UNCONSCIONABLE SINCE IT RESULTED IN DETERIORATION OF 
"GOODWILL" SOLD TO PLAINTIFF AND CREATED WINDFALL TO 
DEFENDANT OF $100,000.00 AND SHOULD APPROPRIATELY BE THE 
BASIS FOR A DENIAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
A case where the Supreme Court has upheld a trial court's 
denial of attorney's fees upon equitable considerations is the case 
of Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976). In that case the 
assignee of a vendor's interest in a real estate sales contract 
brought an action against assignees of the purchasers to quiet title 
to the real property covered by the contract and declare forfeiture 
of sums paid thereunder. ( Ibid at 607.) The Uniform Real Estate 
Contract had a provision in it for awarding attorney's fees "in 
case of default the defaulting party shall pay costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in enforcing the 
agreement, or in pursuing any remedy with respect to the property." 
( Ibid at 610.) The court in analyzing the case indicated that due 
to the complicated nature of the case that both parties thought that 
they had some justification for making their respective claims in 
the property. ( Ibid.) Then the court made a very interesting 
statement: 
A suit of this nature involving the invocation of a forfeiture 
and/or the enforcement of a purchase contract invokes 
consideration of the principles of equity which address 
itself to the conscience and discretion of the trial 
court. ( Ibid.) 
The court in looking at the Blood case noted that plaintiffs 
had received $12,150.00 which was forfeited and not recoverable to 
the Defendant. The Court then stated that "in view of these 
circumstances we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to require defendant to pay the plaintiff's 
attorney's fees". What the court was saying basically is that the 
plaintiff had already been benefited or aggrandized by the 
forfeiture. Therefore, the court was remiss to permit the plaintiff 
further recovery by awarding it attorney's fees. 
Our case is very similar to that one in that Mr. Crawford had 
already received 200,000.00 for goodwill in the enterprise which he 
sold. His conduct which deteriorated the goodwill which he sold to 
plaintiffs resulted in a windfall to him. Such conduct should shock 
the conscience of the higher court and should not be further 
rewarded by an award of attorney's fees in this action. 
Defendants-Appellants accepted the provision in the contract 
-19-
constituting his agreement not to compete against 
Plaintiffs-Respondents in the new car business. This provision of 
the contract stipulated that defendant would "not compete with a new 
car franchise within a 30 mile radius of a current dealership for a 
period of two years from the date of closing11. Defendant had agreed 
verbally with Plaintiffs as to the meaning of said provision, i.e. 
that he would not sell new cars, and it was upon such 
representations by defendant that plaintiffs entered into and 
executed said agreement. Defendant Crawford then turned around and 
used the ambiguity of this provision to surreptitiously sell current 
model cars claiming that the sale of these cars was not countenanced 
within this provision. This conduct clearly was contrary to the 
verbal and written agreements between the parties and was 
unconscionable. Furthermore, when Plaintiffs determined that 
Defendant was in the business of selling new cars, Plaintiffs 
confronted Defendant with that fact. Defendant sold his remaining 
new car inventory to the Plaintiffs and then proceeded to continue 
to operate in competition with the distributorship that he had sold. 
The trial court was fully apprised of these facts as a result 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment made by Defendants wherein they 
sought to be dismissed from the case. (Record II.) This matter was 
fully briefed by memoranda from the respective parties and a hearing 
was held on the matter. Thus, the court was fully apprised of Mr. 
Crawfordfs conduct which he never denied but fully acknowledged. 
However, based on his technical reading of the Motor Vehicle 
statutes, Appellant Crawford believed his conduct did not violate 
the contractual agreement that he had entered into with Plaintiffs. 
Appellants in support of their conduct in selling new cars 
repeatedly refer to the definitional provisions of the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Code. For the Court's benefit let us look at those 
provisions. Utah Code Annotated Section 41-3-7 "Definitions" 
provides the following: 
(16) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle which has 
never been titled or registered and has been driven less 
than 7,500 miles, unless the motor vehicle is a trailer or 
mobile home, in which case the mileage limit does net 
apply. 
(17) "New motor vehicle dealer" means a person who has a 
franchise from a manufacturer of motor vehicles to sell 
new motor vehicles and who is engaged in the business of 
selling or exchanging new or new and used motor vehicles, 
or who sells, displays for sale, offers for sale, or 
exchanges three or more new or new and used motor vehicles 
in any 12-month period. 
Under subparagraph 17 a "new motor vehicle dealer" is not just 
one who has a franchise from a manufacturer. According to " the 
latter part of that provision one can also be classified as a "New 
motor vehicle dealer" if he "sells...three or more new...vehicles in 
any 12-month period". 
Therefore, not only were Appellants violating the 
noncompetitive agreement with Respondents, they were also violating 
the dealer licensing laws of the State of Utah. 
The trial court stated in its Memorandum of Decision that it 
considered all of the facts and evidence before it in making the 
determination that there was not a prevailing party in this lawsuit. 
That undoubtedly was based upon the unconscionable conduct of Mr. 
Crawford. Respondents herein contend that the unconscionable 
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conduct on the part of Defendant Crawford should form the basis for 
a denial of attorney's fees. 
The second factor which the court considered in its 
determination that neither party was entitled to attorney's fees was 
that Respondents did not dismiss the case with prejudice because of 
a lack of confidence in their position. Quite the contrary, the 
Plaintiffs felt and still feel that the position they maintained in 
this lawsuit would have been successful had the matter been 
litigated on the merits. As is noted in the court record, one of 
the Plaintiffs filed bankruptcy and consequently withdrew that 
financial support from the case. Mr. Cobabe, the other Plaintiff, 
after 30 months of litigating this matter clearly ran out of 
resources to continue to pursue legal action against Defendants. 
This factor along with the fact that Plaintiffs had paid to Mr. 
Crawford $200,000.00 for the goodwill of this enterprise forced the 
court to consider the equitable positions of these parties and rule 
in the manner it did. 
ARGUMENT 
IV 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM MAKING A CLAIM FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SINCE THEIR CONDUCT AND READING OF THE 
CONTRACT RENDERS THE NONCOMPETITIVE PROVISION NULL AND 
VOID. 
In the case of Turtle Management, v. Haggis Management, Utah, 
645 P. 2d 667 (1982) the court was faced with determining the 
appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees. Prior to resolving 
that issue the court stated that Utah adheres to the well 
established rule that attorney's fees generally cannot be recovered 
unless provided for by statute or by contract.( Ibid 71.) Then the 
court went on to say that if the award for attorney's fees was by 
contract that such an award would only be allowed in accordance with 
the terms of the contract. ( Ibid.) Appellants are maintaining that 
despite the clear language of the noncompetition provision in the 
contract and the prior understanding of the parties that they are 
nonetheless able to conduct themselves in derrogation to this 
provision because of the definitional provisions in the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Code. Since their position is one of clearly disavowing the 
noncompetitive clause, it is inconsistent for them to now reverse 
that position and attempt to rely upon the selfsame provision in the 
contract for an award of attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
V 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED SINCE 
APPELLANT IS NOT DEFENDING SUCCESSFUL LOWER COURT RULING 
AND RESPONDENTS HAVE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESPOND. 
The Utah cases to date which have awarded attorney's fees for 
appeal as well as at trial involve cases where the appellant 
successfully defended a favorable lower court ruling. In the case 
of Jenkins v. Bailey, which was cited earlier, Bailey was denied 
attorney's fees although he was considered to be the prevailing 
party at the trial court level. Furthermore, the Defendant who had 
prevailed on a counterclaim based on a cause of action for 
conversion was granted attorney's fees. In that case Bailey was 
considered to be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee in bringing 
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the appeal in addition to attorney's fees that were awarded for his 
activity at trial. Our case is distinguished from that one because 
neither party was deemed to be a prevailing or successful party. 
Consequently, this is a case of first impression and should be 
regarded as being unique from the cases cited earlier. The case of 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) is a typical case 
whereby attorney's fees were rendered for successful defense on 
appeal arising out of an action to enforce a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
CONCLUSION 
U.C.A. Section 78-27-56.5 provides that a court may award 
costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails. The 
statute clearly places discretion in the trial court regarding the 
award of attorney's fees. This prerogative on the part of the lower 
court is consistently upheld by Utah case law. Appellants contend 
that a technical reading of definitional provisions of the Utah 
Motor Vehicle Code permits them to conduct themselves contrary to 
the clear intent of a noncompetitive clause in their contract with 
Respondent. Respondent contends that Appellant's reading of the 
statute is incorrect, their conduct clearly violated the agreement 
of the parties and was patently unconscionable. The lower court 
considered the evidence and acknowledged that Plaintiffs had a 
legitimate cause of action against Defendants. That coupled with 
Respondent's inability to continue in the lawsuit, served as a basis 
for the court's dismissal with prejudice without an award of 
attorney's fees. 
We have seen in the discussion which has preceded this 
Conclusion that the Utah courts have in some cases acknowledged 
equitable considerations in matters regarding the award of 
attorney's fees. Respondents herein ask the court to consider the 
unconscionable conduct of Appellants coupled with the fact that they 
have been benefited in a windfall fashion in receiving $200,000.00 
for goodwill that Appellants themselves had deteriorated by their 
competitive conduct in selling new cars within a 30 mile radius of 
the dealership that they had just sold. 
Respectfully submitted this /Z^-day of December, 1988. 
GALL-rATJ) & WESTFALL 
\ R u s s e l l J, 
OA^Oy 
l l i a n 
es E. Slemboski 
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THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 2itn day of January, 1935, 
by and between B. GLEN CRAWFORD £ PAULA CRAWFORD, His Wife, dba CRAWFORD 
TOYOTA OF ST. GEORGE, and CRAWFORD INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah Limited Part-
nership collectively referred to as "Parties of the First Part" or "Sellers" 
herein, and H. LeROY COBABE and LEWIS R. CANFIELD, or nominee, hereinafter 
referred to as "Party of the Second Part", or "Buyer" herein: 
WITNESSETH: 
THAT WHEREAS, Seller owns, controls and operates an sutomobile dealer-
ship under the name CRAWFORD TOYOTA; and 
WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell, and transfer certain Assets of 
Dealership i.e. CRAWFORD TOYOTA, subject to certain of its obligations to 
Buyer on tne terms hereinafter set forth; and Buyer further desires to 
purchase from Seller the real property upon which the automobile dealership 
is operated (Business Premised), all which are more particularly set forth 
on the attached Schedules "A" & "B" herein, subject to the terms and cond-
itions of this Agreement. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand 
Dollars) Earnest Money herein deposited, the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, and in consideration of their Mutual Covenants and promised, 
each to the other given, it is hereby agreed as follows, to wit: 
1. That the purchase price of the real property and improvements 
thereon, shown on the attached Schedule "A" herein, which Crawford Investment 
Company is the fee owner on, shall t)e the sum of $425,000.00. (Four Hundred 
Twenty Five Thousand Dollars.). 
2. That Seller conenants for a fee of $100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars) not to compete with a new car franchise within a 30 mile radius of 
currant dealersnip for the period of two (2) years from date of closing. 
3. That the purchase price of certain fixed assets, machinery, parts 
bins, furniture and fixtures to be listed in Scnedule "B" to be attached 
hereto and made part hereof, which -are used in connection with Sellers 
dealership, all for the purchase price of $160,000.00. (One Hundred Sixty 
Thousand Dollars). Said assets are now and will be at closing in working 
order. Such price shall also include the current telephone numbers of Seller 
which Seller shall assign for the exclusive use of Buyer and all forms such 
as repair orders, counter tickets for an additional $1.00 (One Dollar). 
L. In addition to the above purchase price, Seller shall sell to 
Buyer, and Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's new or rebuilt and un-
damaged and unused Toyota parts and current accessories, wheels, tires ect. 
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parts and accessories whicn Seller has on hand at the time of closing. The 
cost of these parts and accessories which Buyer shall pay to seller at close 
of escrow and througn escrow snail oe the current net wholesale price for 
said items as published in the most recent Distributors1 s price books. An 
inventory shall be taken by both Buyer and Seller prior to the closing 
of escrow by an inventory service mutually acceptable to Vne parties viVn 
the cost of tne inventory to be equally divided and paid by both parties, 
through escrow, for the parts and accessories inventory. The inventory 
will be taken in the presence of a representative of both Buyer and Seller. 
The parties agree that, for the purpose of the escrow pursuant to the 
Agreement, and subject to adjustment as a result of the inventory, the 
value of the parts shall be $30,000.00 (Thirty Tnousand Dollars). Sucn 
adjustment will be accomplished Five ($) days after receipt of the 
written inventory by each of the parties, by payment in cash from Buyer to 
Seller, of Seller to Buyer as the case may be. Seller shall assign to 
Buyer all of Seller's parts return rights, if any. between Seller and 
the respective automobile manufacturing corporations. 
5. Buyer agrees to assume balance of Sellers one year contract with 
K.C.L.G Radio Station, and to purchase from Seller balance of credit with 
K.C.L.G at face value less 15? dicount not to exceed $2200.00. (Twenty Two 
Hundred Dollars). Payment to be within two weeks of close of escrow. 
6. That the above items shown in #2, 13, J?i» and H5 are in addition 
to the purchase price stated in #1 Above. 
7. That the terms and conditions of payment for said items 1 through 
4 inclusive above, is total in CASH, due at Close of Escrow, which shall 
occur on or before March , 24 , -19 85 (30 day extension to be granted 
if financing is not finalized prior to March 24, 1985.) 
8. That this purchase does not include any motor vehicles. If Seller 
desires to sell and Buyer desires to buy automobile inventory, as of 
closing date, the parties will inspect each vehicle and agree upon the 
purchase price of such car. Provided, however, &s to any vehicle which 
the parties do not agree upon, as to value, such vehicles snail be retained 
by Seller and not become part of this transaction-
9. Seller shall sell and Buyer shall purchase all of Seller's 
work-in progress and sublet repair inventory and otner ^iscellaneaus 
inventories (such as lubes, gas, grease, nuts, bolts, ect.) related to the 
operation of the dealership. The price shall be paid by Buyer to Seller 
at close of escrow and through escrow, and shall be based en a physical 
inventory of said assets and shall be valued at Seller's costs. Such 
inventory shall be taken by a representative of both Buyer and Seller, with 
the cost of taking such inventory to be divided 2nd paid equally by tne 
parties. Work in Progress and sublet repairs shall refer to service work 
on repair orders )customer, insurance or warranty) written by seller 
prior to date of closing of escrow, but not complete as of that date. 
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Buyer agrees to complete all said work-in-process. Cn payment by Buyer, 
for such work-in-process or sublet repairs, Buyer is authorized to bill the 
customer when the work is completed by Buyer for the entire service to the 
customer, and Seller shall have no claim to that billing. 
10. Seller shall retain all factory warranty and other claims, 
tax credits and claims for refunds, together with contracts, accounts and 
notes receivable. It is intended that Seller will collect all such rec-
eivables and will change Seller's address to a different postal address 
for such purposed; however, Buyer agrees to cooperate and deliver to Seller 
all payments and materials concerning same received by Buyer.
 s /] 1 ^(Z^ 
11. That for the period of Thirty (30) years following the Close 
of Escrow of this transaction, Seller has the right to purchase two (2) 
new Toyota's per year of his choice at "invoice cost", the delivery of which 
shall occur Thirts (30) days or before after ordering. Deliverance is 
subject to availability of such cars from factory. This right is non-
assignable by Seller and in the event Buyer herein resells said dealership 
his Buyer shall own the dealership subject to this convenant, which shall 
be binding upon the heirs, executors, assigns, nominees and grantees of the 
Buyer herein, 
12. This transaction shall be concuraraated through an escrow with 
Southern Utah Title Company . Upon operning of escrow, Buyer 
shall deposit $20,000.00 Earnest Money towards the purchase price.** See attached 
On or before close of escrow (which shall take place on or before thl s c r o w Instructio-
24th day of March > 1985) buyer shall deposit in escrow the balance of 
the purchase price due to Seller which is to be transmitted through escrow. 
If buyer fails to make afore mentioned deposit, this agreement is voidable 
by written notice by either party without futher consideration. Seller 
shall comply with the Bulk Sales -Law through escrow," and Seller and Buyer 
shall excute all documents relation thereto, bills of sale, and other 
documents reasonably required pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
The parties hereto agree to excute the escrow company's standard form of 
escrow instructuons incorporating the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement; and in the event of any conflict between said escrow instruc-
tions and the Agreement, the terms and conditions set forth in this 
Agreement shall control. 
13. At the Close of Escrow Buyer shall be responsible for obtaining 
ids own liability and fire insurances, and that gereral property taxed shall 
be prorated at close of excrow, and any escrow or documentation needed in 
this transaction, with all costs of same being borne eaually 50/50, except 
that Buyer shall provide own title insurance if he desires same, 
M. All obligations of Buyer, at its option, are subject to the 
fulfillment, prior to or at close of escrow, of the following conditions: 
(A) The franchisors for the automobile and truck* franrhi KP<? 
as now exists between said franchisors and Seller, which franchise terms 
shall be acceptable to Buyer. Buyer and Seller will cooperate and use 
their best efforts to effect said termination and reissuance of dealership 
sales agreements, 
(B) Buyer's obtaining all required licenses and permits from 
governainental or ather agencies to operate a new car dealership at the 
premises occupied by Seller. Buyer agrees to use its best efforts to 
obtain all such required licenses and permits. 
(C) Buyer1s receipt of approval from Buyer's lending institution 
as to flooring and financial arrangements satisfactory to Buyer required 
by this agreement. 
15. Buyer is not assuming any liabilities of Sellers. Buyer is 
specifically not assuming any warranty liabilities except for factory 
issued warranty of Seller for sales of automobiles or for word done by 
Seller prior to the Closing Date. 
16. Buyer hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and hold Seller harm-
less against and in respect of any and all claims, demands, losses, costs, 
expenses, obligations, liabilities, and damages, that Seller shall incur 
or suffer, which arise or result from the use of the Assets or the operation 
of the Dealership subsequent to the Closing Date. 
17. Seller makes the following representations and warranties: 
(A) Seller is not aware of any union organizing efforts which 
have occurred with respect to the Dealership. 
(B) With the exception of the new car inventory, all inventory 
of Seller being transferred herein is fully paid for and there is no related 
obligation of liability currently butstanding with respect to any portion 
of said inventory, except as disclosed on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, and 
unsect,r*~* accounts payable. 
(C) Within the times and the manner described by law, seller, 
to the best of its knowledge, has filed all federal, state, and local tax 
returns required by law with respect to the Dealership, and has paid all 
taxes, assessments and penalties due and payable thereon. Said tax returns 
reflect the correct and full amount of any tax liability owing by Seller 
on said returns. Seller has made all estimated tax payments required to 
be made for payroll taxes up to the Closing Date. 
(D) All the assets are usable and are in reasonably good 
condition, normal wear and tear excepted. 
(E) To the best of its knowledge, Seller has coirplied with 
and is not in violation of applicable federal, state or local statutes, 
laws, and regulations affections the assets of the Dealership or the 
operation of the Dealership business. 
(F) There are no claims, actions, suits or proceedings 
pending whether administrative or otherwise, or to the knowledge of Seller, 
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threatened agaist them with respect to the Dealership. 
(G) The execution and performance of this Agreement will not 
result in any breach or violation of, or be in conflict with, any agree-
ment instrument, or contract relation to Dealership. 
(H) Seller has the right, power, legal capacity and authority 
to enter into and perform its respective obligations under this Agreement, 
and no approvals or consents of any other persons are necessary to transfer 
to Buyer the Assets set forth in this Agreement, other than the consent of 
the respective automobile manufacturing corporations. 
(I) All representations and warranties made by Seller herein 
shall survive the closing. 
18. Buyer represents and warrants and such representations and warr-
anties shall survive the closing, that: 
(A) The execution and delivery of this Agreement and the 
consummation of the transaction by Buyer have been duly authorized and no 
futher corporate authorization is or will be necessary on the part of the 
Buyer. 
(B) Neither the execution nor delivery of this Agreement nor 
its performance will result in a violation or breach of any term or pro-
vision of, nor constitute a default under, any material contract or agree-
ment to which Buyer is a party. 
19. All representations and warranties of Buyer and Seller set forth 
in this Agreement will also be true and correct as of the Closing Date as 
if made on that date. 
20. That the Earnest Money shown herin shall apply towards the 
purchase price shown in #1,#2,#3» $ H* inclusieve, but in the event Buyer 
defaults in the purchase herein, except for the reasons shown on Item //H 
above, said Earnest Money shall be fordeited to Seller as liquidated 
damages. 
21. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit 
of the sucessors, assigns, personal and legal representatives of Buyer 
and Seller. However, Buyer may transfer its rights to a nominee provided 
that Buyer and Nominee shall both be liable for full performance of this 
agreement. 
22. This agreement sets forth the entire understanding between 
the parties in connection with the transfer of assets, there being no 
terms, conditions, warranties or representations other than those contained 
i * 
herein, attached hereto, or provided for herein. 
23. In the event of any litigation between the parties hereto to 
enforce any provision or rights hereunder, the unsuccessful party to 
such litigation shall pay to the successful party therein all costs and 
expences e-cpressly including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys1 
-5-
fees and court costs incurred herein by such successful party, which 
costs, expenses and attorneys fees and court costs incurred by sucn party 
in or in connection with such litigation. 
21* All notices, requests, and demands and other communications 
hereunder shall be in writing, including telegrams, and shall have been 
deemed duly given if personally delivered or sent by registered or certified 
mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, or by telegram, rate paid 
confirmation requestee. 
If to Escrow Holder: Southern Utah Title Company 
P. 0. Box 190 
St. George, Utah 84770 
If to Buyer: . H. L. Cobabe 
1 Crestwind Drive 
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA> 90274 
If to Seller: B. Glen Crawford 
109 Vest Hope Street 
St. George, Utah 84770 
25. Buyer agrees that prior to the Closing date (and thereafter 
if theclosing fails to occur), Buyer and his representatives will hold in 
strict confidence all data and information obtained in connection with tnis 
transaction. 
26. Buyer may, at its option, assign all of its rights and obligations 
hereunder to a corporation which Buyer may form prior to closing. However, 
said assignment "shall not relieve Buver of its obligations hereunder. 
27. Buyer will, as or "cne date or ulosing, terminate those of its 
employees who will not continue to word for Seller. At the time of termina-
tion, Seller will pay to its employees all prorated vacation benefits to 
which they are "entitled at the time of their termination. Seller shall 
provide each employee with a notice of such termination and use its best 
efforts to obtain as acknowledgment by each terminated employee of tneir 
receipt of said notice. The acknowledgment by each employee shall be kept 
in each employee1s personnel file. All employee personnel files shall remain 
the property of Seller on closing: However, Buyer shall have reasonable 
access thereto if needed by Buyer. Buyer has no obligation to hire any of 
Seller's present employees. 
28. Pending consummation of the sale and purchase described in this 
agreement, Seller shall continue to operated said business in substantially 
tiie same manner as it has been operated by Seller in the past and Shall: 
-6-
(A) Use its best efforts to maintain pleasant and harmonious'' 
relationships with all suppliers, customers, employeed and others having 
contact with said business. 
(B) Maintain in full force and effect, at its own cost and 
expense, insurance policies insuring for their full insurable value the 
tangible assets of said business against loss or destruction by fire, the 
elements, theft or civil disorder. 
(C) Excercise due diligence in safeguarding and maintaining 
the confidentiality of all books, reports, and data pertaining to such 
business. 
(D) Grant no increases in salary, pay or other employment 
related benefits to any officers, employees, or agents of said business 
without the written consent of Buyer. 
(E) Enter into no contracts or transactions, except in the 
ordinary course of business, on account of said business, without the 
written consent of Buyer. 
29. All actions to be taken on the closing date pursuant to this 
Agreement shall be deemed to have occurred simultaneously, and no action, 
document or transaction shall be deemed to have been taken, delivered or 
effected, until all such actions, documents and transactions have been taken, 
delivered or effected. 
30. Should any terra, provision or paragraph of this Agreement be 
determined to be illegal or void or of no force and effect, the balance of 
the Agreement shall survive except that, if the Buyer cannot acquire all of 
the assets described herein, Buyer may terminate this Agreenent, and it shall 
be of no further force and effect. 
31. This Agreement may not be changed, modified, or amended except 
by writing signed by the parties hereto, and this agreement may not be dis-
charged, except by performance in accordance with the terms, or by writing 
signed by the parties hereto. 
32. Time is of the essence in this agreement, and all of the terms, 
covenants and sonditions thereof. 
33. At Closing Seller shall have the right and option of purchasing 
any vehicles (at invoice cost) now ordered which have not yet been delivered 
which Seller has deposits on. 
34. That any parts, supplies or inventory which the Seller has already 
ordered which are delivered after close of escrow or after inventory taken 
(whichever occurs latest) shall be the responsibility of the Buyer, including 
uhe payment therefor. 
35. All Deposits and prorates which, are normal and reasonable shall 
be made by Escrow as of Closing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have excuted this Agreement 
on
 the ^^ Day of January, 1985 
CRAWFORD TOYOTA 
Bv zm^z^me 
B. Glen Crawford / 
By_£m 
Paula Crawford 
CRAWFORD INVESTMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah Limited Partnershic 
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THE COURT: 85-0518, Cobabe and Canfield and 
St. George Toyota versus Crawford. 
These are added on cases, I!m informed. 
MR. NUFFER: Mr. Hughes has been around this 
morning, Your Honor. I'm not sure where he is now. 
There are two motions up. Both are mine. A 
motion for withdrawal and a motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs1 Complaint. There haven't been any responsive 
pleadings filed, but I know that Mr. Hughes would not sign 
the stipulated dismissal of the case; so, he must object 
in some way to the motion. 
THE COURT: The matter has been noticed for this 
morning for a hearing; is that correct? 
MR. NUFFER: Yes. 
THE COURT: In the absence of Mr. Hughes, your 
motion i s g r a n t e d . Here comes Mr. Hughes. 
I j u s t granted the motion, Mr. Hughes. Did 
you want t o comment on i t ? 
MR. HUGHES: I d o n ' t ob jec t t o t h e i r case being 
d i smissed , Your Honor, except I hopefu l ly would have tn< 
oppor tun i ty t o go forward on the b a s i s for my a t t o r n e y ' s 
fees which I ' v e expended in defending i t t hus f a r . 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
1 THE COURT: Have you filed a Counterclaim? 
2 MR. HUGHES: No. But I!ve defended the action and 
3 have incurred attorney's fees. And the action was 
4 defended under a written contract that in the event of a 
5 lawsuit^ the prevailing party is to receive attorney's 
6 f e e s . 
7 MR. NUFFER: Your Honor, on t h a t i s s u e , I have some 
8 a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t I ' d l i k e to give the Court and 
9 Mr. Hughes, deal ing s p e c i f i c a l l y with t h i s i s s u e . 
10 Mr. Hughes r a i s ed the concern about having 
11 a t t o r n e y ' s fees awarded. I ' d re fe r the Court and 
12 Mr. Hughes to the l a s t case in t h i s compi la t ion , which i s 
13 a Tenth C i rcu i t Federal c a s e . 
14 This case i s one in which the p l a i n t i f f — 
15 THE COURT: What's the name of the case you ' re 
16 r e f e r r i n g to? 
17 MR. NUFFER: Mobile Power En te rp r i se s versus Power 
18 Vac. 
19 THE COURT: Let me see if I can find that. 
20 MR. HUGHES: And I've been around Mr. Nuffer for 
21 about three hours this morning, and I've just received 
22 this, Your Honor. And I wish'he would have given it to me 
23 about 9:30. 
24 MR. NUFFER: This i s a Tentlr Circuit^case*decided . 
25 in 1974. i t J s c o n s i s t e n t wi th o the r cases—in-wftici^a 
pla in t i f fr seeks ' a""dismissal~ with" prejudice . 
And I f d refer vou to the th i rd page of th i s 
printed mater ia l , which is ac tual ly Page 6 of t h i s WestLaw 
pr in tou t . 
The defendant in th i s case, Anilas, suggests 
tha t where a p l a i n t i f f voluntar i ly dismisses an ac t ion , 
the defendant is en t i t l ed to recover c o s t s . While th i s is 
an accurate statement of the law with respect to dismissal 
of actions without prejudice, the Court lacks power to 
allow costs ," barring exceptional circumstances, i f the 
dismissal" is" with pre judice . 
And then skipping down to the next 
paragraph. Anilas also r e l i e s on the lease/purchase 
agreement for jus t i fy ing the t r i a l court decis ion. Before 
Anilas-could rely on th i s contract provis ion; however, i t 
must have f i l e a a Counterclaim as required by Rule 13(a ) . 
Now, we contend, therefore , t ha t th i s same 
rule tha t a — would apply. Because we're seeking a 
dismissal which the Court may order with prejudice, and 
because there was no Counterclaim f i led with regard to the 
claim for a t t o rney ' s fees , tha t an award of a t to rney ' s 
fees and costs on t h i s dismissal would not be 
appropria te . 
The other two cases tha t I 've given are Lake 
Creek I r r i g a t i o n versus Clyde, a Utah case , in which a 
1 d ismissa l without prejudice was made and a t t o r n e y ' s fees 
2 I were assessed. 
This is not — this is consistent with the 
4 I Mobile Power case. The theory being that if the dismissal 
5 is without prejudice, the defendant may again be put to 
6 the cost of the litigation. Where the dismissal is with 
7 prejudice, as in the other case, Murray First Thrift 
8 versus Benson — and also a Utah case — where the 
9 dismissal is with prejudice, there is no award of 
10 attorney's fees as in Mobile Power. But here in Murray 
11 First Thrift, we see a decision of this district in which 
12 a dismissal with prejudice was made after the plaintiff 
I *—^c\ ~~~ 
13 moved for dismissal without p re jud ice ; fees were not s*^ 
14 awarded. 
15 And I'll grant that the Murray First Thrift 
16 case does not even consider the award of fees, but I will 
17 represent to the Court that my research has not been able 
18 to uncover the case of dismissal with prejudice on the 
19 plaintiff's motion where fees have been awarded. 
20 So we submit that the dismissal should be 
21 granted without an assessment of fees. 
22 Other factors that would militate against an 
23 award of fees are that I am informed and Mr. Hughes has 
24 been informed that oneLOfcthe-iindividual plaintiffs has 
25 filed bankruptcy. And as I pointed out, there was not a 
Counterclaim for the a t to rney ' s fees r e l i e f . 
2 I Further , the provision I think under which 
3 ] Mr. Hughes would claim a t t o r n e y s lees i s a provision or 
4 the contract providing that the successful party in 
$ l i t i g a t i o n would be en t i t l ed to an award of fees . And in 
6 t h i s case, the p l a i n t i f f is moving for d ismissa l , and I 
1 would submit t ha t tha t does not indicate success on the 
$ par t of the defendant, rather i t indica tes the 
9 p l a in t i f f — the p l a i n t i f f ' s f inancia l resources are 
10 I simply exhausted and can ' t go forward. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Hughes? 
12 MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I would object to the 
13 Court, even considering t h i s au thor i ty . As I indicated 
14 I 've been here about 90 minutes in the courtroom and 
15 received t h i s hand-delivered Py Mr. Nuffer. I assume h e ' s 
16 had i t in his hand. 
17 If the Court were to even consider to dismiss 
18 the action without an assessment of a t to rney ' s fees , we'd 
19 l ike at l e a s t 10 days to respond to the research which was 
20 ] YianQ-delivereo. to me a t an emP^xx as singly l a t e t ime , 1 
21 think. 
22 THE COURT: I'll be glad'to give you the time to 
23 respond. 
24 MR. HUGHES: And, Your Honor, it's our feeling that 
25 barring that, we would resist dismissal of the claim. 
PAUL G. MCMHT.T.TM. rcn ODD 
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I might a lso ind ica te t h a t as a matter of 
housekeeping in here , the order of Mr. Nuffer ' s f i l i n g 
documents i s somewhat qu i zz i ca l to de fendan t ' s counsel ; in 
t h a t he f i l e s not a motion to withdraw, but a simple f l a t 
withdrawal of counse l . Then immediately t h e r e a f t e r — 
apparen t ly a f t e r f i l i n g his withdrawal — made several 
motions on behalf of the p l a i n t i f f s , including the motion 
in o ra l argument today. And I need to know whether I need 
to f i l e a motion for the o ther s ide to appear in person, 
or whether Mr. Nuffer has withdrawn and has argued these 
as a cour tesy to h i s e x - c l i e n t s , or whether h e ' s s t i l l in 
t he case* I d o n ' t know. 
THE COURT: I can decide t h a t . He's s t i l l in the 
c a s e . 
MR. HUGHES: Okay. We'd l i k e to respond to t h i s , 
Your Honor. And we are prepared to go to t r i a l l a t e r t h i s 
month. 
THE COURT: All r i g h t . I ' l l give you the time you 
need to respond to the motion to d i s m i s s . 
When is the case s e t for t r i a l ? 
MR. NUFFER: The 22nd, I t h i n k . . 
THE COURT: All r i g h t . We ' l l have the matter back 
on on the law and motion day on the 20th for dec i s ion . 
You have u n t i l then to submit your p o i n t s and a u t h o r i t i e s . 




























I t h a t regard while 
been f i l e d by Mr, 
Al l r i g h t . 
Your Honor, could I j u s t i n d i c a t e in 
s t i l l on t h i s case , t ha t no response has 
Hughes to the pleadings that have been 
f i l e d to t h i s p o i n t . And we would ob jec t to h i s 
submissions as being un t imely . There i s no ob}ect icn : o 
the mot ions , e i t he 
MR. HUGHES: 
i s a t t ached to Mr. 
jr one. 
And you can see from my l e t t e r which 
Nuffer's Affidavit tha t says, "In the 
event you intend t o go forward, p l e a s e advise me, and I ' l l 
provide whatever a d d i t i o n a l d i scovery you may need," Your 
Honor. 
And we would be w i l l i n g t o do t h a t , but I 
d o n ' t want to expend another $2,000 in a t t o r n e y ' s fees on 
a case in which I 
q u e s t i o n a b l e ^ 
If I 
t h a t the Court — 
THE COURT: 
think tha t l i a b i l i t y is at best 
may reca l l to the Court one statement 
Well, I think what Mr. Nuffer is 
1 say ing , you d i d n ' t f i l e any response t o h i s motion to 




That 's what I 'm'saying'. And t h a t ' s — 
And t h a t ' s correct? 
That ' s t r u e , Your Honor. I d i d n ' t . 
But t h e r e ' s no memorandum in suppor t of i t . I t ' s j u s t 
P A U L G - M f M H T T T M rou i ^ r > 
1 these a l l e g a t i o n s tha t his c l i e n t c a n ' t afford counse l , 
2 and t he r e fo re they want to dismiss the cause of a c t i o n . I 
3 d o n ' t th ink t h a t ' s proper grounds for d i smissa l with 
4 p re jud ice without an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f ee s . 
5 Now, he ' s come up with some memoranda I would 
6 l i k e to respond t o . Had I had these c a s e s , I would have 
7 prepared a response. 
8 THE COURT: You've got t h a t t ime. 
9 MR. HUGHES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: We'll see you both on the 20th. 
11 (Whereupon the proceedings in the 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Notary 
Public, in and for the County of Washington, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That, the foregoing matter, to wit, H. LEROY 
COBABE, et al. VS. B. GLEN CRAWFORD, et al., Civil 
No. 85-0518, was taken down by me in shorthand at the time 
and place therein named and thereafter reduced to 
computerized transcription under my direction. 
I further testify that I am not interested in 
the event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 26th day of 
August, 1S88. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-91 
,/T'-
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
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4 I THE COURT: C i v i l No. 85-0518, Cobabe and o t h e r s 
5 I versus Crawford. Motion t o d i s m i s s . 
Mr. Nuffer? 
7 MR. 'NUFFER: This i s a motion t h a t was on the 
8 c a l e n d a r , was i t two weeks ago? 
9 MR. HUGHES: I t was on about t h a t t ime . 
10 Your Honor, I might apologize t o t h e Cour t . 
11 I intended to ge t my memorandum t o the Court F r i d a y . I 
12 was in Las Vegas t ak ing d e p o s i t i o n s and d iscovered t h i s 
13 t h i s morning. So I had i t hand-de l ivered t h i s morning t o 
14 t h e Court and to Mr. Nuffer . And we, of c o u r s e , d o n ' t 
15 o p p o s e 1"hp> mot-inn t o d i s m i s s . 
16 THE COURT: Is this your memorandum? 
17 MR. HUGHES: If it --
18 THE COURT: I t ' s no t t h e o r i g i n a l . Do you have an 
19 o r i g i n a l copy of i t ? 
20 MR. HUGHES: I have — I th ink I f i l e d the o r i g i n a l 
21 wi th t h e c l e r k . And I t h ink t h a t ' s what t he cour t c l e r k 
22 i s t r y i n g to i n d i c a t e . 
23 Your Honor, I wanted t o ge t s u f f i c i e n t c o p i e s 
24 around, and I wasn ' t aware whether t h e Court had p u l l e d 
25 t h e f i l e or n o t . So t h a t i s p robably a copy of t h e — t h e 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 


























original would have been filed this morning. 
don 
has 
And as I was indicating to the Court, 
't oppose the dismissal with prejudice that Mr. 
indicated, we simply submit that we are entitle 
fees pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the contract that 
sued upon. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nuffer, anything? 
MR. NUFFER: Well, our position is that the 







cited in the memorandum delivered this morning 











Court two weeks ago; that there was no Counterclaim 
attorney's fees filed or pleading of the contract by 
defendant; that bankruptcy has, in fact, been filed by 
of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, Mr. Lewis 
Canfield — I received notice"of that last week — that, 
in fact, the defendants had not been successful within the 
cont :emplation of the term of the contract; so, the] 
basis for an award of attorney's fees. 
Further, that the award of attorney s 
would be discretionary with the Court, and that th< 
law which was cited last time regarding the fact o. 
dismissal with prejudice not justifying an award o: 
is appropriate 





\nd I believe the case should be dismissed 
1 with prejudice without any award of costs or fees to 
2 either party, T would nm'nt to the Court that the case is 
3 set to begin on trial later this week. 
4 THE COURT: On Wednesday. 
5 MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I think the cases I've 
6 cited to the Court from the Washington and Oregon 
7 jurisdictions are exactly on point. The one case alone, 
8 Western Stud Welding, Inc. Versus Omark Industries, Inc., 
9 involved a quasi noncompetition clause. 
10 In that particular instance, there was a 
11 voluntary dismissal witlr prejudice. And that court held 
12 that the attorney's fees were allowed under those 
13 circumstances when they were otherwise allowed by the 
14 c o n t r a c t . 
15 The Oregon ru l ing even c i t e s t h a t - t h a t r u l i n g 
16 i s — t h e ques t ion t h e r e i s whether a d i s m i s s a l witnout, 
17 p r e j u d i c e should e n t i t l e someone to fees as a d i smi s sa l 
18 wi th p re jud ice o r d i n a r i l y does . And the Supreme Cour t - in 
19 Oregon s t a t e s t h a t voluntary d i smis sa l wi thout 
20 p r e jud i ce — t h a t t he r e i s no reason t o hold them any 
21 d i f f e r e n t than when claims a re dismissed wi th p r e jud i ce 
22 for purposes of a t t o r n e y ' s f ees ; t h a t t h e r e i s a 
23 p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y . 
24 I might i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e r e i s a c i t a t i o n — 
25 I have an Arizona c a s e , i f I may, Your Honor. And i t has 
1 a citation, I just read it. And I would indicate to the 
2 Court that when our Answer seeks attorney's fees in 
3 defending, they are put on notice that we do seek and 
4 claim fees. And I believe that this is sought for in our 
5 relief, and it is plainly before the Court in a contract. 
6 We'd submit it. 
7 If I may have a minute, I f d l i k e to find t h a t 
8 Oregon case . I t ' s in 646 P.2df and I j u s t read i t in the 
9 o f f i c e . I t was a rehearing denied ca se . 
10 THE COURT: While you ' re looking, l e t me j u s t ask 
11 you have you f i l e d any Affidavit or anything s t a t i n g your 
12 claim for a t t o r n e y ' s fees? 
13 MR. HUGHES: I haven ' t f i l ed an Af f idav i t , Your 
14 Honor. Because a t t o r n e y ' s fees , as the Court i s well 
15 aware, under Utah law i s subject to cross-examinat ion . I 
16 f i l e d pleadings in t h i s c a se . I'm sure my Answer seeks 
17 a t t o r n e y ' s f ees . 
IS The Oregon case tha t I ' d c i t e to the Court — 
19 j u s t a minute. I bel ieve I have i t . As I look a t t h i s 
20 ca se , i t may be an Arizona case . There ' s a case Hark 
21 LightingTFixture-Company Versus General E l e c t r i c Supply. 
22 Jus t*a minute, 'Your Honor. Yes. I bel ieve 
23 the Oregon case , Your Honor, is WackerrSi l t ronic Corp. 
24 Versus Pakos,~646 P.2d 1366, And in t h a t c a s e , the re was 
o q
 an issue of whether or not- the re was.a responsive pleading 
f i l e d and the mere f ac t t h a t because~of- a• l e t t e r in t h a t 
c a s t / the attornev,>has beemput , on^not ice by^defense 
c o u n s e l j i h a t thpv.would, in f a c t f seek a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
I th ink i f the Court examines my Answer in 
t h i s c a s e , we're defending on a c o n t r a c t and say , "No. 
We're not l i a b l e . We're e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y ' s fees on 
the terms — under the terms of t h e c o n t r a c t . " And I 
th ink t h a t s e t s up the defense of a t t o r n e y ' s fees in t h i s 
c a s e . I might — and I b e l i e v e t h a t squa re ly s e t s i t 
before the Court . 
THE COURT: All r i g h t . I ' l l t ake the mat te r under 
submission and ru le on i t t h i s a f te rnoon a f t e r I ' v e read 
your c a s e . 
MR. HUGHES: Thank you, Your Honor. And I — i f 
t h e Court d e s i r e s , I could ge t a copy of — and I b e l i e v e 
i t ' s t h a t Pakos case — t o Mr. Nuffer and the Court 
momentarily. I j u s t read i t . 
THE COURT: T h a t ' s a l l r i g h t . I can j u s t look a t 
i t in t he book. 
There i s one o the r m a t t e r , though, t h a t I 
want to add re s s . I s t h e r e a ques t ion of anybody t h a t 
t h e r e ' s a r e s o l u t i o n of the l awsu i t in anybody's favor? 
As I understand the l a w s u i t , i t was decided to d i smiss t h e 
case because the p l a i n t i f f s c a n ' t a f ford to f inance the 
l awsu i t any f u r t h e r , even though they t h i n k t h e y ' r e in t h e 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR. PPP 
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r i g h t . 
Do you want to address t h a t i ssue as i t 
r e l a t e s to your r i g h t to recover a t t o r n e y ' s fees? 
MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I don ' t th ink — obviously 
we c a n ! t get a judgment aga ins t Mr. Canf ie ld . I think the 
f i l i n g of his bankruptcy i s abso lu te ly superf luous to the 
Cour t f s r u l i n g . Because we're not reques t ing a judgment 
aga ins t Mr. Canf ie ld , we ' re obviously reques t ing a 
judgment for fees agains t the remaining nonbankrupt 
p l a i n t i f f s . 
As far as whether they can afford to go on or 
n o t , t h a t ' s a problem they should have addressed when they 
f i l e d the l a w s u i t . I think an examination of the record* 
would revea l t h a t a majori ty of the i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and a 
major i ty of the depos i t ions in t h i s case — almost a 
two-to-one r a t i o — were no t i ced up by t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and 
so t h i s i s not a case where the defendants have 
obs t reperous ly t r i e d to cos t -ou t the p l a i n t i f f s in the 
l awsu i t . And I would simply say t h a t the record would 
r e f l e c t t h a t the majori ty of expenses incurred in t h i s 
lawsui t was incurred on the motion or on the reques t under 
the 'discovery p r i n c i p l e s by the p l a i n t i f f s . They drove up 
t h e i r own c o s t s . 
THE COURT: Response, Mr. Nuffer? 
MR. NUFFER: The Pakos case t h a t Mr. Hughes c i t e s 
is another case of a dismissal without pre judice . One of 
the cases tha t we ci ted a t our l a s t hearing deals with the 
question of whether there is a successful par ty . And I 
don ' t have tha t — those cases again with me, but they 
were given to the Court a t the l a s t hearing. 
THE COURT: I ' l l look at those. 
MR. HUGHES; Bur the point of the Pakos case, Your 
Honor, is discussed — 
THE COURT: I can derive my own opinion from i t . 
I ' l l jus t read i t . 
MR. HUGHES: And the Willamette case which I c i ted 
c i t e s Pakos and says t h e r e ' s no d i f ference . I might 
indicate tha t the following three j u r i s d i c t i o n s follow 
tha t ru l e , t ha t t h e r e ' s no difference as far as the award 
of a t to rney ' s fees . Washington, Oregon, and Arizona 
follow both of those in the case of Mark Lighting Fixtures 
versus General E lec t r i c Supply Company, which is at 
745 P.2d 123. 
And in those cases , the issue is whether or 
not they should award a t torney-s fees when i t ' s without 
prejudice , c l e a r l y s t a t i ng tha t when i t ' s with prejudice , 
the a t to rney ' s fees should be awarded. 
THE COURT: All r i g h t . I ' l l pass the matter . 
Now, as I understand i t , what you're saying, 
Mr. Hughes, is i f I decide to rule in your favor, you'd be 
1 p r e p a r e d t o go forward w i t h evidence as t o your a t t o r n e y ' s 
2 f e e s / s u b j e c t t o c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ? 
3 MR. HUGHES: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
4 THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . I f l l review i t l a t e r t h i s 
5 I a f t e r n o o n . 
MR. HUGHES: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, t h e ma t t e r was p a s s e d . ) 
8 I THE COURT: Let me j u s t make a r eco rd on 
9 C i v i l No. 85 -0518 , H. LeRoy Cobabe v e r s u s B. Glen 
10 Crawford. 
11 Having reviewed t h e memoranda f i l e d by t h e 
12 c o u n s e l , t h e motion t o d i s m i s s i s g r a n t e d . The t r i a l d a t e 
13 which was t h i s Wednesday i s v a c a t e d . 
14 The motion for a t t o r n e y ' s f ees i s d e n i e d . 
15 The r ea son b e i n g t h a t i t i s a p p a r e n t from t h e p l e a d i n g s in 
16 t h e f i l e t h a t t h e r e a s o n t h e p l a i n t i f f s have sough t t o 
17 d i s m i s s t h e c a s e i s n o t because they f e e l t hey have no t 
18 p r e v a i l e d or t h a t t h e y cou ld no t p r e v a i l , b u t because t h e y 
19 were under ext reme f i n a n c i a l p r e s s u r e s which p r e v e n t them 
20 from going f o r w a r d . 
21 Under t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I f ind t h a t 
22 n e i t h e r p a r t y has p r e v a i l e d , and n e i t h e r p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d 
23 t o a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s under t h e c o n t r a c t . 
24 W e ' l l ask t h e c l e r k t o make n o t i f i c a t i o n of * 
t h a t and ask Mr. Nuffer t o p r e p a r e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e order ." 
1 (Whereupon the proceedings in the 
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THE COURT: The next matter is Civil No. 85-0518, 
Cobabe versus Crawford. 
I'm not sure what this is on for. 
MR. NUFFER: Well, this is the case that I still 
want to get out of after a couple months. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. NUFFER: Mr. Hughes would like to publish some 
depositions on my way out, but the Court has an order of 
dismissal — well, the Court actually has three different 
orders of dismissal and an order allowing my withdrawal — 
all proposed and some objected to — and I would like to 
see the case terminated. I'd like to be relieved of my 
responsibilities to act as counsel. 
THE COURT: I've already signed the order of 
dismissal, and I believe I've already signed your order 
allowing your withdrawal. 
MR. HUGHES: Which order of dismissal did you 
sign? 
THE COURT: The one submitted by Mr. Nuffer. 
MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, just for purposes of the 
record, when I read — Mr. Nuffer responded to a letter 
























of the order. 
Is the Court indicating — I oppose the 
language of his longer version because it seemed to me 
that that version did not set out one single argument I 
had earlier made to this court to grant us attorney's 
fees. And when I checked with the Court staff yesterday 
to find out what order of dismissal had been executed, we 
were told that it had not been. But we would suggest — 
THE COURT: It has been. As has the order allowing 
withdrawal. They were both in the file, as are your 
proposed orders, which I have not signed. 
MR. HUGHES: Did the Court — well — 
THE COURT: So that was done on July 13 after I — 
MR. HUGHES: I assume the Court took into account 
15 all the arguments I presented and were recorded by 
Mr. McMullin. I simply wanted to preserve those for 
appeal, and I don't think those arguments were preserved 
in the order. 
THE COURT: Why not? You mean in his order? 
MR. HUGHES: In his order. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure that they have to 
be. But I've signed the orders. The matter, is now 
dismissed, and Mr. Nuffer is now out of the case. I've 
made a matter of record your proposed orders which are in 
the file. Frankly, I just for the record don't see a 
1 great deal of difference in any of the orders submitted. 
2 MR. HUGHES: The only thing I wanted to make note 
3 of and I wanted the Court to note is that Mr. Nuffer had 
4 at least intimated in his order that the Court did not 
5 have my arguments in mind, or that somehow they had been 
6 submitted untimely. And I did not understand the Court to 
7 say that. 
8 THE COURT: I did not read the order t h a t way in 
9 the f i r s t p l a c e . And i f t h a t ' s what you want me t o c o v e r , 
10 I c e r t a i n l y did have your arguments in mind and had 
11 received your arguments a t the t ime I made the d e c i s i o n . 
12 MR. HUGHES: Thank you. T h a t ' s the only th ing I 
13 wanted t o p rese rve for appea l . 
14 And on the motion t o p u b l i s h t he d e p o s i t i o n s , 
15 I have made a motion t h a t a l l . d e p o s i t i o n s be pub l i shed for 
16 p a r t of the r eco rd . And I would assume t h e r e i s no 
17 ob jec t ion to t h a t . 
18 THE COURT: Well , a t t h i s p o i n t , Mr. Nuffer i s n ' t 
19 in the c a s e . The re ' s nobody to o b j e c t . So, I suppose i f 
20 you want to proceed any f u r t h e r , y o u ' l l need to give 
21 n o t i c e to the p l a i n t i f f s to appear in person or appoin t 
22 successor counse l . 
23 MR. HUGHES: A±± r ignn . 
24 (Whereupon the proceedings in t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r 
25 were concluded.) 
5 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Notary 
Public, in and for the County of Washington, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That, the foregoing matter, to wit, H. LEROY 
COBABE, et al. VS. B. GLEN CRAWFORD, et al., CIVIL 
NO. 85-0518, was taken down by me in shorthand at the time 
and place therein named and thereafter reduced to 
computerized transcription under my direction. 
I further testify that I am not interested in 
the event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 26th day of 
August, 1988. 
.-f. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN,.-.CSB^RPR 
v •;:-"-•/, 
RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah /-' V V,', \ 
c
 ? \ -i 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-91 ; !} *JO-A*._ ,
 :, 
\ PUBLIC '.' ,' 
Appeal* 5" 
: : r COURT 
• O'JNTY 
DAVID NUFFER - A2431 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
A Professional Corporation 
SO East 200 North 
P O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84770 
801/628-1611 
File #2S5201/di2 
'88 JUL 13 PF1 1 Z3 
> E?LTY x^ /(sz$'oz, -i^/>^^ 
IN THE FIFTM JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
H. LEROY COBABE and LEWIS R. 




B. GLEN CRAWFORD, PAULA 
CRAWFORD, and CRAWFORD 






Civil No. 85-0518 
This matter was submitted to the Court on the Motion of Plaintiffs for Dismissal 
filed May 23, lyss, tor tne stated reason tnat Plaintiffs were financially unable to 
continue to prosecute the case. The Defendants made no response to the Motion 
until June 7, 1988, the date of heanng thereon, and filed no written response to the 
Motion until June 21, 1988. 
The Court heard the arguments of counsel on June 7, 1988, and then heard the 
Defendants' request for an award of attorneys fees against the Plaintiffs. The parties 
agreed that dismissal was appropriate. The Court tnen considered the authorities 
submitted by Plaintiffs'in'opposition to such an award of attorney's fees, together with 
other objections, and set the matter for June 21, 1988, to allow Defendants time to 
submit responsive authorities. 
Order of Dismissal With Prejudice Pa3s1_ 
On June 21, 1988, the Court again heard counsel, who agreed as to the 
dismissal, and heard the Defendants' request for an award of fees. Plaintiffs objected 
on the grounds that the request and response to Plaintiffs' motion was untimely, that 
Defendants had filed no counterclaim, that one Plaintiff had filed bankruptcy, that as 
the dismissal was with prejudice there should be no award, that there was in fact no 
•successful party in the litigation, within the meaning of the contract, and that sucn an 
award was within the discretion of the Court. The Court, having reviewed the file, and 
being fully advised in the premises, now finds that: 
1. The parties are in agreement that the case should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. There is no reason the Court should not dismiss the case with prejudice. 
3. Neither party has prevailed in this action, and neither party to this suit is 
"successful" within the meaning of the terms of the agreement entitling award of 
attorney's fees. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above matter 
is Dismissed, with Prejudice. The trial setting is vacated. Each party shall bear its 
own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this 13 -day of CJuJ^ , , 1988. 
BYTHEO^URT: 
(O-'Qfej^ Z&Q-6*-
J/PHILIP EVES (/ 
District Court Juage 
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